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The Return Earned by Private Industries and
Public Utilities*
By Raymond Edward North
I

Despite the ever growing complexity of business and commer
cial intercourse, with its seeming confusion, the profit motive
remains the principal stimulus. Men engage their capital and
ability in industry primarily with the hope of pecuniary reward,
and if their quest is unsuccessful they either voluntarily withdraw
or else that which they have is taken from them. If successful,
they are entitled to the fruits of their labor. The right to the
enjoyment of private property is guaranteed in the federal
constitution and forms a cornerstone in our social structure. All
industry, whatever its reaction to prosperity or adversity, is
concerned first, last and always with the return it can expect to
earn upon the value of the investment which has been engaged in
the business.
One group of the privately owned industries has become known
as the public-utility group because of special characteristics which
are peculiar to that industry. A utility is engaged in producing
and rendering an "essential service,” but that alone does not
distinguish it from a so-called industrial. The steel manufacturer,
the coal-mining operator, the furniture manufacturer, the owner
of a patent for a universally required invention, the clothing
manufacturer and the building contractor are all producers of
things essentially necessary. Yet their products are not said to
be "effected with a public interest ” as in the case of utilities. The
telephone, water, gas, transportation and electric companies have
the additional and distinguishing characteristic of exercising a
monopoly within a given territory. The residents of a modern
city have no choice from whom they shall take electric or telephone
service. On the other hand, while clothing may be just as
essential as gas for the evening meal, each person has the widest
latitude in the choice of the shop he will patronize, the price he
cares to pay and the style of clothing he thinks will become him.
If there is to be one utility company, rendering one service to one
* An address delivered at a meeting of the Maryland Association of Certified Public Account
ants.
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group of customers, it is only equitable that one price be charged
to all, that there be no discrimination between customers, and that
whatever the price may be, it be not excessive or unreasonable.
When there is also considered the fact that these public-service
companies occupy, use and enjoy the public highways and have
the right of eminent domain, the need for some method of regula
tion as a guard against undue self interest is clearly apparent.
So it is, then, that while the purpose of the industrial and the
utility is identical, i. e., to supply something desired by people, for
a return over and above cost, the method of controlling the return
to each is entirely different.
The history of public-service enterprises roughly covers a period
of one hundred years. The gas industry is one of the oldest of the
group, dating as it does in America from the opening of the
nineteenth century. The telephone was yet an experiment when
Alexander Graham Bell exhibited it at the Centennial celebration
in Philadelphia in 1876. Edison’s pioneering work in the electri
cal industry was becoming fruitful at the same time, for in 1882
the first central station was built in the city of New York. Steam
transportation had been proven practicable as early as the third
decade of the nineteenth century. The early utility enterprises
were treated as any new industrial enterprise would be treated
today. That is to say the field was open to all comers for such
exploitation as they cared to undertake. A general struggle for
existence ensued, generally to the dissatisfaction of the public.
Discrimination was prevalent. Rate wars succeeded one another
in a regular order. The dominant company in each territory
either forced the weaker companies out of business or bought
them out. And at all times there was a constant danger that the
streets would be torn up by some new competitor, often with the
purpose of forcing the existing companies to remove the threat at
a handsome profit to the promoter. After a protracted period of
such unrestricted competition, detrimental to the public and to
the utilities themselves, one company generally survived in each
locality. The practice of commission regulation, delegated with
authority by the state legislature, was then evolved. This
development came with the twentieth century as an acceptable
contribution to social progress and commercial growth. Utility
regulation has been adequately tested during the last fifteen or
twenty years, and where undesirable influences have been absent
the results have been salutary.
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II

Although industrial enterprises are ostensibly uncontrolled,
they are nevertheless regulated through the operation of natural
laws and the free interplay of economic forces. The return to one
such industry is not limited as to amount, but it is directly de
pendent upon managerial skill and ability. Competition serves
to fix the selling price for similar ventures while the skill with which
a particular company is operated largely determines the cost of
production and hence the spread between the two—or the return
to that company. Capital and ability naturally tend to flow into
the most profitable fields. As the influx continues, competition
becomes keener, a larger supply is created and unless the demand
can likewise be enlarged, prices will recede. An industrial will
gain or lose, probably succeed or fail, as it can create and sustain
a demand for its product and supply that demand at a cost under
the selling price. The successful company is therefore the one
which can maintain or reduce the cost of production at or below
the average cost for its class. If the industry continues to afford
returns higher than other industries with comparable risks, there
will be an accession of new competitors to the ranks. Prices will
gradually become lower, approaching the average cost of produc
tion as the limit. The spread between cost and selling price is
gradually lessened as the field is developed. The marginal pro
ducer is then the first to be forced out. He must offer his goods
at the current quotation in order to sell them at all, but he finds
that his higher production costs make his continued operations
unprofitable. He therefore quits, either voluntarily or involun
tarily. As the influx of competitors continues or the available
supply exceeds the present demand the less efficient producers
will continue to be eliminated and only the more efficient will
survive. Later, if a greater demand develops or if capital is
withdrawn from the industry, so that the return to those remain
ing would again become larger than to other industries attended
by similar risks, accessions to the ranks will begin and the cycle
will be repeated. It can be seen that the supply-and-demand
law regulates selling prices, but that cost of production determines
the return to the industrial and its success. This is another way
of saying that the return an industrial gets depends upon the skill
and ability of the management. If the cost for a company
is equal to the average for its class, the return will be an average
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return. If the cost is below the average, the company so situated
will enjoy a higher return. There is no limit to what it can earn.
An increase in business and profits is more surely obtained by
lessening the cost of production than by increasing the selling
price. An increase in the selling price may produce, not more
income, but less income. The management of an industrial
should prefer to sell one thousand units at a profit of ten cents
rather than five hundred units at a profit of fifteen or eighteen
cents. Suppose that an increase in the output of five hundred
units would throw a greater supply on the market than the normal
demand would sustain. In that event a new demand must be
stimulated or else intensive sales efforts must be used to capture
the customers of competing companies. In either event the most
satisfactory way to induce the additional purchases is to reduce
the sales price. But if the added business is to be profitable, or,
better, if the whole volume is to be proportionally more profitable,
the cost of production must also be reduced. Often the very fact
of the greater output will alone reduce costs, since the indirect
charges, such as supervision, depreciation, insurance, taxes and
repairs may not increase as the direct charges for material and
labor do. The success of the United States Steel Company or the
Ford Motor Company and the satisfactory return which each
earns are due largely to their low operating costs, made possible
by mass production and able management. In the final analysis
then, the question whether or not an industrial can earn a return
greater than the average for its class is determined by whether or
not it can produce the commodity or service at a cost lower than
the average. The management of private industry has a great
inducement (if, indeed, it is not a compelling force) to reduce the
cost of production as the most effective means of increasing profit.
And with the benefit of greater profit to the producer, there in
variably goes the benefit of lower prices to the consumer. Prices
are not fixed arbitrarily at this or that level, all that has been
claimed about combinations in restraint of trade to the contrary
notwithstanding.
This discussion does not overlook the occasions when returns or
profits are independent of production costs. In a seller’s market
when prices are rapidly rising—rising more rapidly than costs—
and a general wave of prosperity is being enjoyed, the return is
accordingly increased. The larger return, which may be con
sidered as consisting of two elements, (a) the normal return
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incident to the industry and (b) profit due to extraordinary condi
tions, is predicated upon the excessive demand as distinguished
from individual operating efficiency. Conversely, during an
unsupported buyer’s market, when prices may drop below produc
tion cost, losses are incurred which the most able management
can not avoid. Again, this discussion does not overlook the large
gains made possible by discovery of new natural resources—gains
that may be unrelated to the cost of development. But these
conditions are usually temporary. At least they are exceptional.
The tendency of prices to approach cost of production is a long
time tendency. And the statement that cost of production
finally determines return applies to general conditions over a
period of years. Within an industry during periods of rapidly
rising or falling prices, the low cost producer always earns the
greatest return. Ordinarily there is no criticism when an indus
trial earns an excessive return, or profits, even when these profits
accrue from a combination of circumstances not brought about by
the industry and over which it has no control. The reason for
this is simply that at a later date the industrial may suffer a
deficient return, or losses, due also to conditions over which it
has no control. The possibility of gain is offset by the hazard of
losses. In the long run private industry is forced to its best
effort in order to survive.

III
Contrasted with the natural forces operating to regulate the
return to industrials is the more artificial commission form of
regulation that has been developed in the utility field. The
necessity for commission regulation is no longer debatable. It
strongly appears that regulation is here to stay and enough expe
rience has been had to remove it from the realm of experiment.
The principles of utility valuation and rate making have become
well settled. It is pertinent to inquire whether commission regu
lation in any way may destroy the incentive of utility manage
ment, so forcefully preserved in the other great group of privately
owned industries—the so-called industrials.
Prices charged for service by utilities are composed of two
factors: (a) the cost of the service and (b) a return to the utility.
The costs of operation include manufacturing or generating costs,
such as fuel, labor, oil, supplies and maintenance, plus commercial,
general and administrative costs, taxes and an allowance for
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property retirements. The return, or that part of the rate to
which the owners are entitled, is measured as to its adequacy by
its relation to the fair value of the property used and useful in
the public service. Utilities generally have the right to establish
service rates themselves, subject to the approval of the public
service commission.
Rates are not established at what the service is intrinsically
worth, for obviously the pure subjective value of an essential
service—water in the home, for instance—is incomparably great.
In the first instance, rates may be fixed at what the traffic will
bear. In some cases rates may be prescribed by public opinion.
For instance, some street-railway companies do not earn a return
as liberal as the local commission would permit, simply because
public opinion has associated the five-cent fare with surface
electric lines for so many years that a higher fare is difficult to
obtain. The same prejudice undoubtedly works against gas
companies in some cities. There is less opposition to electric and
telephone company rate revisions in the opinion of John Moody,
the investment analyst. An inquiry to determine the fairness of a
rate is necessarily a process of the application of arbitrary (i. e.,
discretionary as against natural) methods.
Public-service commissions have no formula for arriving at rates
or approving those previously established, except merely to
indicate the lower and upper levels between which the rate should
fall. A rate should not be fixed at a point so low that the income
produced will be inadequate to meet the cost of production plus a
compensation to the owners for the use of their property. This
is the lower level—the point of confiscation. The owners of
public utilities have ample protection against that contingency
in the provision of the federal constitution protecting property
from confiscation—a provision the courts have never hesitated to
enforce. The upper level is more vaguely described as that point
where a given rate will become unreasonable and unduly excessive
or simply that point where the rate is greater than the value of the
service to the customer. The precise determination of the point
between these two extremes for fixing a fair rate constitutes the
main function of the regulatory commission. Ordinarily, there is
a wide range within which the commission may exercise its
judgment. The general rule remains that a rate must be reason
able to the company and to the customer. Of the two, reason
ableness to the customer is paramount. Neither of these limits
94
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is a test of the fairness of a rate. That is, if a utility finds that
the income it is receiving does not permit a fair return, it will not
be justified in increasing the rate solely because the increased
rate would not be unreasonable or more than the worth of the
service. On the other hand the utility could not be denied the
increase solely upon evidence that the present rate is not confisca
tory. These are but the extremes—the non-compensatory rate,
the extreme to which the utility may suffer without intervention
of the court, and the excessive rate, the extreme to which the cus
tomer may suffer in any circumstances.
If we assume that utility management is honest, the portion of
the rate to recover operating expenses is reduced to a question of
measurement. The utility will report and disclose the cost of
rendering service, such amount will represent a dollar for dollar
recovery and there will be nothing included in the cost for return
or profit. The amount of the return and the percentage it bears
to the property value will vary from year to year and become the
index for measuring the fairness of the rate. A most important
question in public-utility economics concerns the position the
commissions are going to take with respect to the return. Among
the industrials, return is virtually the reward for skill and ability.
The characteristics which distinguish the utilities from all other
private enterprises do not distinguish them on this point. What
ever return they earn is or should be the reward for skill and
ability. Our present system of regulation may result in the
stagnation of initiative and managerial zeal if sound policies
are not evolved.

IV
There is a mistaken idea among some people that a return to the
owners of public utilities may be held stationary, or nearly so,
without causing disturbance in any other factor of an intricate
and sensitive arrangement. An attempt to maintain a fixed rate
of return, e. g., a return that shall always be equivalent to 7 per
cent. on the fair value of property, could ultimately have but one
effect. Managerial zeal and efficiency would be discouraged, if
not stifled. The owners of such a utility then become virtually
mere annuitants of their property lulled into a state of compla
cency without definite assurances that they can always earn as
much and without hope of earning more than the prescribed
return. There would be no change in the result whether the
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fixed rate of return were a high return, a low return or an average
return, if any improvement in operating conditions were the signal
for a reduction in rates to bring the utility back to the previous
level. If the permitted return were liberal there would be a
strong inducement for the utility to become extravagant. It
would not feel the urge to operate in the most economical manner
because reductions in the cost of production would increase the
already liberal return and precipitate a rate investigation.
Liberal rates of return are not the fashion, however. They are
the goal in a great many cases and not the attainment of the
utility. If the return were just a normal one, again, the mere
prospect that there would be no reward for more efficient service
would discourage managerial incentive. And of course if the
return were less than normal there would be more inducement
to seek higher rates for service than to reduce operating costs.
It is submitted as a sound proposition that commission regula
tion should use every possible means to preserve and encourage
the best efforts of private owners and managers of public utilities
toward reduction of operating costs to an irreducible minimum.
The most satisfactory way to stimulate such effort is to permit the
owners to share the results. Regulation can not accomplish by
fiat for the consumers of utilities what natural laws accomplish
for the consumers of industrial products. If commissions adopt
the "penny wise, pound foolish” policy of strictly limiting
returns, the public can not consistently expect the best sort of
service at the lowest prices. A policy of regulation which does
not recognize or promote economy in all things places a premium
upon extravagance in all things. Many of the war-time govern
mental building contracts were made on a basis of cost plus 10
per cent. profit. The effect was to encourage extravagant and
unnecessary expenditures, for the greater the cost, the greater the
profit. When dealing with the utilities the wisest policy would
seem to be the lower the cost the greater the profit that will be
permitted. Technically, it can be said that a utility does not
make a profit—it earns a compensation for the use of property—
when profits are taken to mean unrestricted gains due to chang
ing relations between supply and demand. But if there is no
hope of increasing its compensation to reward a bettered service,
what likelihood is there that the utility will give the best service
that it can? The cost of this service will be relatively and
actually higher. While the utility may not net more money as
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expenses increase it does recover those expenses, but the consumer
pays more to get less.
If a given rate were set at a given time and in given circumstances, that rate might be fair to the public and to the company.
Thereafter intensive efforts to obtain more business, vigilance in
conducting operations, prudence in making extensions, plus or
minus factors over which the utility has no control (such as general
variations in the business cycle), might produce a greater return
than the given rate was intended at first to yield. Now, to reduce
the rates charged so as to bring the return back to the same per
centage of the property (which simply means that the consumer
gets all the benefit and the utility none of the benefit) is manifestly
unfair. This would remove all incentive to further betterment,
as it is contrary to elementary human experience to expect people
to do their work with zeal when there is no hope for reward. The
consumer profits temporarily only, because he can not expect more
golden eggs after the goose has been killed. The utility will con
tinue to serve its patrons even under such conditions, just as a
slave might continue to serve his master because circumstances do
not afford him any alternative. The capital already invested in
the utility can not easily be withdrawn and may be obliged to
accept a hopeless future. But additional capital can not be
forced into the enterprise.
Enlightened regulation will see that the best policy in the long
run is to encourage utilities to get the most by giving the most;
that while the utility may not expect profits in the sense of exces
sive returns, it may expect to share in the benefits effected
through wise, careful and economical management. It should be
remembered that utilities never are guaranteed any return. It is
to be had only if it can be earned and the return it does earn
arises from the utility’s own effort. Many people have the false
conception that because commission regulation may permit a
certain return if it can be earned the commission guarantees that
return at all times to the utility. The chief difference between the
return of an industrial and that of a utility is that the latter
should fluctuate within much narrower limits. Both are privately
owned and both should be entitled to just reward for their efforts.
With the industrial the reward is predicated finally upon the skill
and ability of the management. There should be no discrimination
against utilities on this point simply because discretionary regula
tion has largely replaced natural laws in the public-service field.
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V

When the utility is not hampered, but induced to conduct itself
in the most efficient manner, two results may be expected: (1) the
lowest rate for the best service, which is the consumers’ primary
interest, and (2) a return favorably comparable to that earned by
similar undertakings under similar conditions, which is the util
ity’s primary interest. A utility thus situated should enjoy the
highest credit, so that the large amounts of new capital which are
required for plant extensions may be obtained at the lowest cost.
The borrowed money will then require smaller interest payments
and consequently make the return still more effective to the stock
holders. From this reference to the cost of money the inference
should not be drawn that the amount of the interest and dividend
payments is any measure of the adequacy of the return. Such
reasoning would lead one in a circle. Whatever return the utility
earns represents all the compensation it gets. That amount
belongs to the utility and may be disbursed or retained as discre
tion requires.
For some reason 6 per cent. has been generally considered a fair
return. It is necessary to break away from the fetish of arbi
trarily associating 6 per cent. with fairness and more than 6 per
cent. with usury. There is no sound basis for such a standard,
reducing as it does all utilities to a common level, where the able
are penalized and the weak subsidized. An arbitrary rate of
return may be fixed in the first instance, whether the commission
has before it a new company or a going company whose property
has not theretofore been valued. What shall this return be?
The special master in the case of Consolidated Gas Company of
New York v. Prendergast, decided by the United States district
court in 1925, determined the rate of return from these questions:
“ If the investors were going to buy or build a property like that of
the complainant, what amount would they feel that the property
should earn in order to induce them to invest their money in the
purchase or construction of such a property? Taking into con
sideration other classes of investment in this locality, with the
comparative risks and return thereon, the rate of return generally
required to secure proper credit for borrowing money and financ
ing its operations, what should a utility company subject to state
regulation be permitted to earn in order that it might compete
successfully with other businesses and be on a parity with them?”
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In this case the special master decided that 8 per cent, was a fair
rate of return. Both the patrons and the utility could rest their
cases upon the correct answers to those two questions.
It is contended, however, that a further provision is needed
unless rate litigation is to be a continuous affair. The further
provision should be a recognition, whether expressly stated or
followed as a fact, by the regulatory body that savings will be
divided between the utility, in the form of enlarged return, and
the public, in the form of lowered rates. One public-service
commission has recently passed an order providing that for each
five-cent reduction in rates to the consumers, the utility at the
same time will be entitled to a return
of 1 per cent. greater.
½
That is a definite and real spur to efficient operation which no alert
management would overlook, except at its own expense. While
the order did not say what would happen if rates were increased, it
is to be presumed that some adjustment would be made in the
return at that time also, especially if previously the return had
been increased when rates were lowered. Rate increases as a rule
are generally obtained long after they are needed and it is quite
probable that the return remains low even after such increase.
The transportation act of 1920 provides for a varying percent
age return on the property of railroads. The act fixed the fair
return for 1920 and 1921 at 5½ per cent. plus an additional
of
1 per cent. in the discretion of the interstate commerce commis
sion. Railroad rates are uniform within a rate group or territory,
so that strong roads will earn more than weak roads at the same
rates. The act accordingly provides that one half of the excess
over the prescribed return may be retained by the carrier and that
the other half shall be paid into a government fund to assist the
weaker roads. It is true that these recapture clauses are the
result of competition between strong and weak railroads—a com
petition absent among other utilities. But they serve to illustrate
the essential fairness of a provision that does not restrict all
companies to a minimum fair return or to any fixed maximum
percentage return, but establishes an average fair return plus one
half of the excess actually earned, however large that excess may
be. The supreme court in the Dayton-Goose Creek case (263 U. S.)
said: “Uniform rates enjoined for all shippers will tend to divide
the business in proper proportion so that, when the burden is
great, the railroad of each carrier will be used to its capacity. If
the weaker roads were permitted to charge higher rates than
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their competitors, the business would seek the stronger roads with
the lower rates and congestion would follow. The directions
given to the commission in fixing uniform rates will tend to put
them on a scale enabling a railroad of average efficiency among all
the carriers of the section to earn the prescribed maximum return.
Those who earn more must hold one half of the excess primarily to
preserve their sound economic condition and avoid wasteful
expenditures and unwise dividends. Those who earn less are to
be given help by credit secured through a fund made up of the
other half of the excess. By the recapture clauses congress is
enabled to maintain uniform rates for all shippers and yet keep
the net returns of railways, whether strong or weak, to the varying
percentages which arefair respectively for them.” (Italics supplied.)
The Dayton-Goose Greek Railway had earned a return of 8 per
cent. after paying over the required one half of excess earnings for
the year. There is no necessity for recapture of utility earnings
(except those of railroads) since there is no competition. But the
principle of varying percentages of return which will be respec
tively fair for different companies is desirable.

VI
In a few words the burden of the foregoing is that industrial
managers have a positive inducement, if not a compelling force, to
produce cheaply and efficiently; that the most efficient are re
warded with the largest returns, and that precisely the same con
dition should be fostered by regulatory commissions for utilities
in the absence of natural laws. Unless utilities are permitted to
share in their own economies, then unusual skill, efficiency or
economy in management becomes a hazard and hence a real
detriment to the utility, since the minimum return is predicated
upon continued exceptional skill. The best way to encourage
incentive and enterprise, it is believed, is to hold out to the utility
the possibility of a larger return. If increases in the return are
predicated upon reductions in the rate for service the nearest
approach will have been made to the natural situation which
governs the industrials. There have been several plans devised to
accomplish this purpose. It is far more important that the public
service commission intelligently engage in the practice of a varying
percentage return, than that any one plan be adopted. The socalled London sliding scale has been tried in England. Charles
S. Morgan, in his book, Regulation and Management of Public
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Utilities, states that the plan has never become of wide application
in this country. In a word, it is a plan of adjusting dividends to
the stockholders with prices to the public. That is, increased
rates are accompanied by decreased dividend payments and vice
versa. The essential thing is, to repeat again what has been re
echoed throughout this paper, that regulation is based on the
exercise of discretionary methods, that the primary motive in all
business is the hope of reward, and, hence, that a very important
part of the commission’s function should be encouragement of that
hope. After all, so far as the return is concerned there is no
difference between industrials and utilities as privately owned
industries. The average return to one must be in the long run
substantially the same as the average return to the other, after
allowing for attending risks. Capital will flow where the return
is the highest, and utilities, since they constantly require capital,
must be assured a return which will attract that capital. The
return, if it depends upon managerial skill and ability, as is true
with the industrials, will be a varying percentage, and it will be a
very good measure by which to judge separate companies.
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